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Abstract
This paper analyzes the changing public/private as well as central/local relationships for the provi-
sion of public security in public places in France. It describes the emergence and development of a 
now frequent public-private mix in policing, based on the hot issue of regulating social behaviours 
in public places. The significance of the French model in terms of the nature of privatization and 
pluralization is then discussed and compared to international trends. The rise of a local level 
public-private mix, while not unique in Europe, appears as a major shift in a French environment 
traditionally characterized by the structural centralization of its public forces.
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  Introduction
In 2010, the regional branch of the Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes, the highest 
public body in charge of overseeing public spending) issued a report on the security 
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policy of the city of Lyons1. The Court declared it illegal for the mayor’s office to 
outsource patrols on the shores of the Rhône River to private companies. In October 
2013, in Meru (a small town in the region of Picardie), a social housing organization 
contracted with a private security company to patrol its halls and cellars. This project 
triggered a chain of public reactions on the status of such spaces and the role of the 
private security sector: should private guards be allowed to patrol the urban public 
space (la voie publique), hitherto a monopoly of police authorities?2  
These events must be viewed in the wider context of the changing public/private 
as well as central/local relationships in the area of policing and security provision in 
France. We endeavour to analyze the meaning of such trends. In this paper, we first 
provide a brief research update on the private security sector in France – since the 
situation varies from one country to another. Second, we describe the emergence 
and development of a now frequent public-private mix in policing, based on the 
hot issue of regulating social behaviours in public places (the very nature of the 
activities of staff tasked with surveilling such spaces is heatedly debated these 
days). Third, we discuss the significance of the French model in light of the current 
questioning of global privatization and pluralization trends by the international 
academic community. The development of a local level public-private mix, while not 
unique in Europe, appears as a major shift in a French environment traditionally 
characterized by the structural centralization of its public forces.
 1. Private Security Research and Controversies in France: a Brief Overview
In this section, we first provide context about the private sector of policing, before 
reviewing the French literature. 9,625 private security organizations were operat-
ing in France in 2012. Almost 6,000 were in fact self-employed individuals, while 
11 employed more than 2,000 staff – 31.5% of the total workforce (I+C, 2013). 
Between 2005 and 2012, there has been a 29.5% increase of the number of private 
security companies. The total revenue of the private security sector in 2012 was € 
5.45 billion, 68% of which was captured by the 217 companies (2.5%) employing 
more than 100 staff (I+C, 2013). Between 1998 and 2010, the sector’s revenue has 
grown at the annual rate of 5.5% (Robin & Mordier, 2013). Since the early 2000s, 
public buyers (hospitals, administrations, etc.) have accounted for less than 25% 
of the total market for private security (23% in 2012) (I+C, 2013). In 2012, the total 
number of private security workers was 148,350, stagnating since 2001 (I+C, 2013). 
In 2010, the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) counted 
131,000 FTE workers (Robin & Mordier, 2013). Most of these jobs are concentrated 
in urban areas, with the Paris metropolitan area being the biggest employment 
zone (I+C, 2013). The high turnover materializes in a hiring rate of 60.5% and a 
1 See ‘Rapport d’observations définitives de la chambre régionale des comptes concernant la gestion de la 
commune de Lyon  Enquête sécurité publique au cours des exercices 2003 et suivants’, released in 2010 
by the Cour Régionale des Comptes.
2 Libération, ‘Faute de moyens, la police cède à la tentation du privé’, November 15th 2013. 
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departure rate of 59% (I+C, 2013). 41.2% of private guards under the age of 30 have 
no educational degree at all (Bauvet, 2007). Wages are among the lowest of all sectors 
(Robin & Mordier, 2013). Women account for 15% of the workforce (I+C, 2013). 
Private security in France has been studied along a number of lines. Economists 
and business scholars study the economic growth of the market for private policing, 
emphasizing the job-creation potential of the sector (Konadje, 2011). The sector is 
a polarized one: while a handful of big companies – many of them foreign, such 
as Securitas (Hassid, 2010) – employing thousands of agents are profitable, many 
very small entities struggle for survival in a competitive context that drives prices 
down (Brajeux, Delbecque & Mathieu, 2013), engaging in borderline illegal business 
and labour practices (Tournyol du Clos, 2006). Under French law, any individual 
with a clean criminal record may start a private security business (Konadje, 2011). 
However, existing mechanisms have been described as lenient with regard to 
‘unclean’ criminal records (Ocqueteau, 2013).
Legal scholars focus on legislation and regulation (Latour, 2009). While the legal 
context had been stable since the 1983 Act regulating private security activities, 
changes were introduced in the 2000s: private agents are now allowed to perform 
more policing activities, especially in airports (Ocqueteau & Warfman, 2011), and 
a new national regulatory body (the CNAPS) has been created (Ocqueteau, 2013). 
The CNAPS brings together public authorities (from the police and the judiciary) 
and representatives of private security employers, and delivers accreditations for 
private security companies. The inter-ministerial delegate for private security, Prefect 
Blanchou (2012), argues in favour of replacing the 1983 Act with a new general law 
regulating private policing. Gohin (2012) analyzes constitutional obstacles standing 
in the way of a complete privatization of policing.
Political scientists and legal scholars have a shared interest in private-public 
partnerships (Chevallier, 2011) and the demonopolization of security (Roché, 2004), 
showing that tax and budgetary constraints force public authorities to hand down 
security policies to the private sector (Latour, 2012). Loubet Del Bayle (2012) has 
concerns about the very ability of private policing to contribute to the common 
good. More specifically, there are concerns about the training, skills, and profes-
sionalization of agents (Brajeux, Delbecque & Mathieu, 2013).
Sociologists who study work conditions and labour relations note that private 
policing in France yields low-skilled, low-pay, high-turnover jobs, often held for 
just a few months or years by young men – few women, except in positions where 
interpersonal skills are considered important (Bauvet, 2010) – from ethnic minori-
ties and/or immigrants in wait of better employment opportunities (Péroumal, 
2008; Scheepers, 2012). The involvement of visible minorities in private policing has 
triggered discussions about racial politics (Arpagian, 2010; Hug, 2000; Scheepers, 
2012). All this makes unionization unlikely (Péroumal, 2007).
Private guards are particularly conspicuous in mass private properties such as 
shopping malls and railway stations (Bonnet, 2006; 2008; 2012; Mongin, 2008), 
where they perform ‘public’ policing missions in spaces which are legally private, 
but practically public. This blurring of the private and the public is a key theme of 
the literature.
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 2. Empirical Examination of the French Experience of Plural Policing
In this section, we document aspects of the empirical reality of plural policing 
in France based on a number of scholarly works excerpted from a rather limited 
literature. By design, we provide a broad and simplified account of these works, 
which pertain to several large French cities. Precisely because our goal is to give a 
broad sense of the French case of plural policing, we focus on identifying general 
patterns rather than detailed, city-specific findings. Readers in search of more 
substantial empirical material are invited to consult these works.
 2.1. Private Security Guards and the Policing of Public Spaces
The growth of the private security sector is largely fuelled by the demand for 
security guards in public spaces or mass private properties. This raises a number 
of concerns. Department stores, shopping malls, and railway stations have been 
around for decades in France, so why the sudden rise in private security employment 
in the 1990s and the 2000s?
Since the police officer population has steadily kept up with demographics, the 
rising numbers of private guards can only be explained by the emergence of some 
new security issue in these particular spaces. Commercial entities buy security 
because they feel they need to: for the business sector, security is an extra cost, and 
plays a less symbolic role than it does for government authorities. This security 
issue may originate in the decline of informal social controls and/or in the rise of 
new behaviours requiring a security response. A plausible explanation in France is 
the rise of antisocial behaviours since the 1980s. Conventional wisdom associates 
these antisocial behaviours to minority youths from deprived neighbourhoods. In 
Bonnet’s (2006) shopping mall, typical antisocial behaviours consisted in petty theft 
and minor disturbances such as youths running, being loud in groups, harassing 
girls and so on. Such antisocial behaviours do not require heavy-handed (i.e. armed) 
policing tactics to be managed.
Bonnet’s (2006; 2008; 2009) study of the relationships between public and private 
security in two mass private properties in Lyon (France) shows that public and 
private actors rely on different policing styles. Daily activities of public police officers 
hinge on bureaucratic, public administration priorities. One of their duties is to 
maintain availability to the public at all times at the station. Because of labour laws, 
manning the desk during business hours is a human resource intensive require-
ment. Police officers also have to perform the judiciarization of public and private 
security work: even mundane incidents require some type of paperwork, which 
eventually builds up to consume more human resources. Police officers are tasked 
to focus on certain types of criminals, such as undocumented aliens, as part of the 
national governmental crime-fighting rhetoric. Because mass private properties 
attract a lot of people (up to 100,000 daily visitors at some railway stations), police 
officers are instructed to look for wanted persons. Drug dealers are also a target of 
the French national police.
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Most of these priorities do not suit the specific interests of the commercial entities 
that manage railway stations and shopping malls – these are in the business of 
retail or transportation, not crime-fighting. The railway company3 and the mall’s 
management aim at making a profit and see security as part of their commercial 
strategy. These companies want guards patrolling the premises, sending the mes-
sage that ‘security is present’. While drug dealers are not necessarily a concern, they 
do care about drug addicts, whose appearance disturbs commonly-held notions of 
doux commerce. Undocumented aliens or wanted persons are not perceived as a 
problem, as long as they behave as normal customers. Hence, the security needs 
of these businesses are not perfectly met by the security offer of the public police. 
The retail industry needs a security that walks the fine line between accommodating 
the customers’ perceived needs (for instance, to get rid of Roma panhandlers) and 
respecting the customers’ perceived sense of fairness and justice (for instance, 
to avoid the use of violence in getting rid of Roma panhandlers). Above all, retail 
businesses need a security that avoids antagonizing customers or their children. 
For instance, while the police tend to perceive minority youths as a criminal threat, 
businesses perceive them as future customers and children of current customers. 
They want to avoid the escalation of conflicts at all costs, and hire private guards 
with minority backgrounds with the belief that better cross-cultural communication 
will thus be enabled. In the shopping mall studied by Bonnet (2006), commercial 
activity had been disrupted, in 1998, by a riot that broke out on the last day of the 
month of Ramadan and involved hundreds of minority youths. Memories of this 
riot have shaped how security is provided. The heavy-handed approach came to 
be perceived by the management as a threat to business, since customers would 
increasingly associate the mall with urban disorder. To avoid further conflicts with 
minority youths, the management hired minority guards and a mediator. The 
security strategy is to avoid another riot, even if that involves letting a few petty 
thefts go unpunished.
The evolution of the security division at the French railway company (SNCF) 
also illustrates these dynamics (Bonnet, 2006). For decades, SNCF internal security 
had been focusing on employee theft, internal fraud, anti-union activities, and 
warehouse protection. It was nicknamed ‘the Fifth Column’ inside the organization, 
in reference to General Franco’s army during the Spanish Civil War. With the rise of 
antisocial behaviours and fear of crime in the 1990s, the SNCF entirely remodelled 
its security division. Instead of working in plain clothes, looking out for employee 
crime, SNCF security guards now patrol railway stations and trains in uniform, in 
an ostensible attempt at reassuring both customers and their fellow co-workers. 
The evolution of the SNCF security division shows how security priorities are 
contingent to company interests. For decades at the SNCF, security had meant 
‘employee surveillance’. When the context changed, SNCF adapted its definition 
3 The French railway company (SNCF) is a public entity placed under the authority of the Ministry 
of Transportation. For most intent and purposes, it acts as a private company with commercial 
objectives. Under French law, railway stations are private spaces, owned by the SNCF (except for 
the platform and railway, which are owned by Réseau Ferré de France – RFF).
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of security, and security now means ‘reassuring customers’. For the SNCF, security 
is a component of a commercial strategy.
This creates conflicts with the public police. Socially speaking, the fact that security 
guards are not strictly regulated by public authorities and that most of them belong 
to minorities sets them apart from police officers. Police officers are mostly white 
French individuals, with some education (civil servant exams are very competitive, 
even for low-skilled jobs like police officer), and being a civil servant is an important 
part of their professional identity. They tend to consider private security guards 
as mercenaries, possibly as a professional threat (because of the cost difference 
between public and private security), but certainly not as security professionals. 
Indeed, some police officers have been known to make veiled accusations that 
private guards might side with offenders.
 2.2. New Jobs in Urban Tranquillity
Concurrently with the above-mentioned privatization trend, housing estates, local 
authorities, and transportation companies have been providing an increasingly 
visible presence in public spaces (or in spaces with a private status but a collective 
usage, such as buses and hallways) by hiring agents of a new kind – not quite police 
officers. As is the case in other European countries – see the English ‘wardens’ 
(Crawford, 2006) or the Dutch ‘Stadswacht’ (Hauber et al., 1996) – this might be 
referred to as the emergence of a new nebula of activities dealing with the treatment 
of petty disorders and the daily mediation of conflictual situations in urban areas. 
These new jobs have risen in a context marked by recurring criticism towards 
traditional professions – the public police, especially, are perceived as cut off from 
the field – and the disappearance of secondary social control occupations.
Depending on the local context, these new actors are given a profusion of denomi-
nations (mediators, night correspondents, stewards, etc.). Their social/professional 
status may differ as well: while some of them are local public employees, most have 
private, temporary job contracts. They may work for various kinds of employers 
(social housing estates, transport companies, municipalities). Some of them even 
work for voluntary organizations subsidized by public authorities. Despite these 
differences, they share similarities that are particularly interesting for our purpose, 
insofar as their activity always consists in regulating public spaces by assuming a 
role that verges on policing. Their missions, relations with other actors, achieve-
ments, as well as their weaknesses will be illustrated below through the example 
of Parisian ‘night-time mediators’4 (Maillard, 2013).
4 Indeed, the city set up a nightwatcher scheme (‘correspondants de nuit’) in 2004. This directly-
run scheme was gradually extended and now employs 135 civil service agents in neighbourhoods 
within 9 districts. They will hereinafter be called ‘night-time watchers’ and ‘night-time mediators’ 
(the French name is ‘correspondants de nuit’). The following developments are based on interviews 
conducted with nightwatchers, their partners and some members of the public, as well as direct 
observations (see Maillard, 2013). 
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 2.2.1. New Jobs on the Fringe of Policing
In all these cases, public officials have considered that public spaces may be regu-
lated by these actors without coercion, and that security may be promoted without 
– at least primarily – resorting to formal police powers.
The emergence of these new actors stems from the idea that public spaces should 
not be regulated through repression alone. While not playing on the register of 
prevention in the usual sense – any more than repression – these actors do seem to 
fit in an ongoing trend toward the professionalization of the monitoring and disap-
proval of uncivil conducts. These new jobs contribute to blurring the boundaries 
between formal and informal social control. If, by ‘policing’, we mean ‘attempts to 
regulate the distribution of security by actual or potential use of force’ (Bayley & 
Shearing, 2001, 2), these agents are at the outer edge of such an activity. Although 
unable to arrest or even fine offenders, they do regulate behaviours in public spaces. 
The question, then, is whether this represents another way of policing cities and 
enforcing peace and order, not performed explicitly by criminal justice professionals 
or directly by the community, but instead by new practitioners attuned to their 
neighbourhoods (Maillard & Faget, 2002; Roché, 2002).
These practitioners, also called ‘mediators’, are thought of by their sponsors as 
intermediary actors between public institutions and civil society and may reinforce 
community cohesion within the public (Baillergeau, 2008). They are associated with 
the idea of strengthening ties both within neighbourhoods and between people 
living in these neighbourhoods and public institutions. They are supposed to help 
bridging the gap between institutions and underprivileged populations, as well as 
fostering ties within neighbourhoods. In various countries – especially in England, 
where policies have been influenced by neo-communitarian thinking – this debate 
has been linked to the need for cohesive communities, able to defend themselves 
from crime (Crawford, 2006). Since these actors usually are mere intermediaries, 
they are not endowed with specific competences and depend on other institutions 
and professions to deliver actual services. A closely related issue is their ability to 
integrate local security partnerships (see below).
 2.2.2. Regulating Public Places and Tackling Low-Level Disorders
To fulfil their missions, these mediators must build relationships with the local 
population and make themselves both accessible and visible on the street. The first 
basic rule is to avoid displaying ‘bad’ relationships in the public space – i.e. direct 
ties with the police. Not only should public displays of complicity be avoided, but 
nightwatchers should strive to stand out from the police in their appearance and 
attitudes, always emphasizing their affiliation to the municipality and their ‘serving 
the community’ spirit.
They have to engage with a huge variety of cultural and social backgrounds. The 
skills and mind-sets required for establishing contact with a homeless man who 
does not speak French, explaining what their job involves to a passer-by, or trying 
to make contact with indifferent or even hostile youths from ethnic minorities are 
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extremely varied. It is by using various resources, drawn mainly from personal 
experience (charm and charisma, linguistic and cultural proximity, authority con-
ferred by age, performing minor favours, shared tastes, humour, etc.) that these 
mediators manage – with greater or lesser ease – to make contact with the public. 
Clearly, these mediators’ individual attributes (ranging from their ethnic origin to 
the neighbourhood they were born in) are an integral part of this process, as these 
attributes are often shared with the public (Divay, 2004). What all these skills have 
in common is an overarching ability to adapt to conditions on the field, detect 
potential sticking points, and find the right register, which will vary according to 
both the circumstances and the available repertoire of resources. This involves 
constant juggling between proximity and distance: knowing how to foster a certain 
friendliness with young people on the one hand, while avoiding any overfamiliarity 
on the other. The fact that these skills are difficult to ‘institutionalize’ and ‘profes-
sionalize’ raises the question of how mediators are trained: while they do benefit 
from a three-month course that includes modules on conflict management, the 
gap between the content of the training course and the skills actually required on 
the field is a source of concern.
On this basis, these actors provide a service which consists in regulating and 
monitoring public spaces. Three major aspects of their activity can be distinguished. 
Firstly, their continuous patrolling and the high visibility offered by their uniforms 
mean they offer a calming presence in public spaces at times of day that can be 
a source of unease for the wider population. Some areas known for being drug-
trafficking spots or high-risk zones are identified in which they must provide this 
visible and reassuring public presence.
Second, they monitor public spaces, especially looking for signs of physical decay, 
thus enabling public bodies to remain responsive with regard to degradations. A 
significant part of their patrols is spent identifying litter ‘hotspots’ and broken 
facilities, and sending this information, on a daily basis, to competent municipal 
services. This activity also means that mediators pass on some general information 
about the state of the neighbourhood, exchanging with partners about potential 
public order disturbances, circulating specific information about local nuisances, 
reporting such environmental blemishes as unauthorized dumps, and so forth.
Finally, the emphasis on compliance with rules, which Sebastian Roché (2002) 
describes as respect for ‘usage rules’ (rules taken for granted regarding usage of 
public spaces) or for ‘order maintenance’ is at the heart of their repertoire of actions. 
Their tasks include intervening at skate-parks to keep the noise level down; accom-
panying young female students or elderly people who don’t feel safe; maintaining 
a dissuasive presence in sensitive areas at problematic hours; reminding people 
of the rules that apply in public spaces; mediating conflicts taking place in public 
places. Such are the night-time watchers’ main activities, as far as regulating the 
public space is concerned.
Given the particularly tense scene in some of these neighbourhoods, with the 
police circulating mostly in motor vehicles, night-time correspondents constitute 
a response located between non-response (authorities making no move despite 
repeated requests from residents) and over-reaction (police using violence over 
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minor incidents). Their interventions aim at making sure that the rules for using 
public spaces are respected, so that these – often very heterogeneous – spaces can 
be attended by all kinds of people. At the very least, they facilitate the coexistence 
of different ways of using public space, and at best they help weaving a social fabric 
by making contact with somewhat marginalised groups such as the homeless, not 
to mention the isolated, such as some elderly people. No doubt their action can 
only be successful provided they achieve the difficult reconciliation of these two 
terms – making sure the rules are respected without being perceived as pure law 
enforcement officers. Whatever the case may be, such success will always remain 
precarious.
 2.2.3. An Uncertain Position
These new practitioners are struggling to establish a clear role for themselves in 
the urban environment, for reasons related to both the nature of the situations 
they have to deal with (e.g. major confrontations between residents and young 
people; conflicts over the use of some facilities) and their scope for action. Four 
uncertainties may be noted.
First of all, their position is an ambiguous one. The line between ‘doing nothing’ 
and ‘doing too much’ is a fine one to tread, especially in Paris, where the security 
field appears rather crowded – from National police officers to Paris municipal 
security officers through the agents in charge of the surveillance of social housing 
estates, not to mention social educators. For instance, several facilities managers 
have mentioned that they do not call the correspondants de nuit when there is a 
problem, either because it doesn’t occur to them, or because they feel that this role 
should be performed by other bodies, within a logic that may be stated as follows: 
‘If it isn’t serious, I take care of it, and if it’s serious, I call in the police or the City 
security officers’.
Secondly, we know that these areas are beleaguered by significant generational, 
social or even ethnic divisions, and that, therefore, expectations towards public 
authorities differ greatly. This means that, even in areas where mediators are 
successful in establishing solid, peaceful day-to-day contact with disaffected young 
people on the streets, their work is not viewed favourably by some of the local 
residents who observe their actions and consider that mediators do not put enough 
distance between themselves and young people, leading to overfamiliarity. Their 
social proximity with parts of the public may in fact contribute to their structural 
professional uncertainty. In other words, remembering the distinctions made in 
the introduction, we might say they have difficulties in developing ‘bridging social 
capital’: rarely able to favour connections between generations or between cultural 
and ethnic groups, they don’t foster mutual understanding between groups of 
people with contradictory expectations. In fact, mediators stand on a tightrope, 
surrounded by territorial antagonisms that must be dealt with.
The third of these uncertainties pertains to the difficult task of mediation itself, 
which involves enforcing rules without resorting to coercion. It could be said that 
mediators exercise a rather fragile authority, being typically faced with only one 
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alternative: reprimanding, albeit unsuccessfully (e.g. when someone rides a scooter 
in a pedestrian area), or not reprimanding (e.g. by not asking someone to turn down 
loud music that is annoying residents) so as not to jeopardize good relationships 
that may have taken a great deal of effort to establish. This difficulty is even more 
pronounced in places affected by relatively long-standing antisocial behaviour 
problems (e.g. sports facilities, public gardens, social-housing areas plagued with a 
mistrust of public authorities). In extremely tense situations, intervening to enforce 
a rule is not an easy matter if one does not have the official authority to sanction 
antisocial or criminal behaviour. Mediators are faced with a cruel dilemma. On 
the one hand, being entrusted with more enforcement powers (for instance to give 
tickets) would consolidate their authority, potentially at the cost of being seen as 
agents of repression. On the other hand, the lack of any coercive powers leads to 
their being perceived as useless, powerless, and not respected by the public, which 
some of them often complain about.
The fourth issue is related to partnerships. As mentioned earlier, these actors are 
mainly intermediaries, producing information for other actors, establishing contacts 
between the public and social services, etc. A central issue is therefore their ability 
to integrate local partnerships (Terpstra, 2008). While some arrangements do exist 
and conflictual situations are few and far between, cooperation remains low and at 
least partly asymmetric, and relationships are largely based on avoidance. Typical 
information exchanges occur at a level of generality that cannot foster any collective 
strategy. The police never direct noise complaints toward night correspondents, 
who in turn very rarely inform the police of failed attempts at mediation. Such is 
the predicament facing these new players: having to cooperate with professions 
whose mandate is clearer and accreditation long established, mediators actually 
tend to work in their shadow (Demazière, 2004).
 3. New Trends Towards the Demonopolization of Legitimate Violence. Is 
Pluralization Further Eroding the Public Police Monopoly?
 3.1. Definitions and Issue Framing
Private security boundaries have been blurred to the point that the field now poten-
tially includes all policing activities, ranging from for-profit to private non-profit 
to purely volunteer policing. It also includes public/private hybrids, which might 
be labelled a ‘policing mix’. In their assessment of the private policing concept, 
Kempa, Carrier, Wood and Shearing (1999) reassess the discovery of the private 
sector in North America based on the studies of Farnell and Shearing (1977) and 
Spitzer and Scull (1977). These works are described as a shock for liberal thinkers, 
whose basic assumption is that government should take responsibility for public 
safety and security. In the liberal view, security should be equally distributed under 
government auspices and through public mechanisms. In the U.S., the initial 
research focused on formal private policing organizations, with men in uniform on 
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the payroll of private companies. This triggered a debate about which organizations 
should be categorized as providing policing.
Another approach of private security emerged a few years later. Reacting to 
the narrow definition of the early U.S. studies, Bayley and Shearing (1996) later 
expanded the concept of private policing so as to include all non-paid forms of 
crime prevention in the community, including vigilantism and public-private 
partnerships. In today’s terminology, the expanded definition of private policing 
would be labelled ‘plural policing’. De Waard (1999) unveiled and measured the 
importance of for-profit policing. Despite stark differences across E.U. countries, 
he observed a growth of the private security sector in Europe. While Europe is 
nowhere near the U.S. or South Africa in terms of its level of privatization, the fact 
that it is not immune to privatization is interesting since the E.U. is composed of 
firmly established, ancient nation-states, with large public forces centrally or locally 
organized (very often at sub-state level).
The expansion of for-profit security is noticeable in several domains in France, 
ranging from cash/valuables in transit services (armoured-car transport of cash for 
banks, art pieces for museums …) to the securing of privately-used buildings or 
publicly-used facilities (airports, train stations, shopping malls, see above). While 
private guards are typically tasked with securing the entrance of premises, other 
forms of private or public-private mix initiatives take place at the local level, often 
called ‘mediation’ (see above) and under the auspices of City Hall or of public 
housing and mass transit agencies.
How does France in general – and the problem of order maintenance in the French 
public space in particular – figure in the discussion of ‘government vs. private enti-
ties in the design and distribution of security in society’? Is any ‘demonopolization’ 
of legitimate violence (Roché, 2002) taking place in France through privatization and 
pluralization? Privatization may be depicted as a collapse of our political organiza-
tion under neoliberal attacks – and as such, denounced by academics (Nogala & 
Sack, 1999) –, but also as a pluralization of security providers (Crawford et al., 2005).
In France, the regulation of small disorders and petty crime is usually distributed 
under the auspices of local government or public service agencies by agents that do 
not belong to a well-established professions, such as the night watchers described 
above. In our examples, they contributed to pacifying public places, as opposed to 
imposing heavy-handed policing by the uniformed police. Although the scope of 
such mediation practices is not exactly known, case studies show that they can be 
found in many major French cities. The French case is therefore not one of pure 
privatization in the sense of non-government organizations assuming for-profit 
responsibility of public safety. Neither is it about professionals of security under-
stood as police officers carrying out investigations or managing crowds. Rather, it is 
about the emergence of mediators or peacekeepers who might become full-blown 
policing professionals in the longer run, should that trend go uninterrupted. It is 
also about restructuring in-house security services so that agents reassure clients. 
Finally, vigilantism remains small-scale and episodic (even non-existent in the 
field research we conducted in Paris). The notion that communities, and therefore 
community members, should be strong and defend themselves is not common 
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in France, where public authorities even have trouble mobilizing neighbours in 
neighbourhood watch schemes5. Limited research suggests that the scope of vigi-
lantism is limited in France and possibly in Southern Europe. While instances of 
vigilantism were punctually observed after large rioting events, they did not spread 
to other neighbourhoods or cities and did not last beyond a couple of months.
Notions of privatization and pluralization are difficult to define, in part because the 
meaning of these words tends to change over time. Nonetheless, our conceptualiza-
tion for France seems to break apart from the U.S. literature published over the last 
decade. France does not experience tensions between central or local government 
and vigilant citizens or private firms, but rather:
a) a new division of labour between central and local government; local govern-
ment increasing its influence and tending to redefine both how public order needs 
to be addressed (increased physical presence on the streets, conflict resolution, 
informing the public about risks), and the personnel who carry these new missions 
(mediators rather than police officers);
b) private companies tending to deliver ‘public services’ in mass private properties, 
with policies aimed at reassuring their clients.
The U.S. and Europe differ greatly in how plural policing is organized, and various 
countries in Europe also vary significantly, while western continental European 
countries seem to share a lot. However, at a higher level of generality and when 
it comes to political symbols and imagery, common ground does seem to exist 
between the U.S. and Europe (including France) as far as issue framing is concerned.
The U.S. debate about the meaning of privatization can be best illustrated by the 
discussion between Brian Forst and Peter Manning (1999). This debate occurred at 
two different levels: the symbolic and the service dimension. Forst, an economist, 
came in defence of efficacy/efficiency and accountability through competition and 
market forces. Peter Manning, a political scientist, advocated the uniqueness of the 
policing sector and the relationship between coercion and government. According 
to Forst, the key factor to decide which policing mix is best should be ‘value for 
money’ (what service for what cost?), whereas for Manning, the symbolism of (good) 
public police should prevail: only a public body can aim at justice and cohesiveness.
In France, the public debate also hinges on the ‘nature’ of ‘internal security’ 
and ‘policing’, albeit in a slightly different way. Such a symbolic approach does 
exist, and advocates of the public view claim that security should be enforced by 
the government in charge – as part of the so-called ‘regalian’ duties6. Others, in 
the name of cost efficiency, push toward the development of private activities and 
proper regulation mechanisms at the national as well as the E.U. level – openly so 
5 The ‘voisin vigilant’ (alert neighbour) scheme was launched in 2006 in rural areas, and was sup-
ported by a directive in June 2011. No comprehensive evaluation of this scheme has been carried 
out. The head of its national association boasts membership of 2000 municipalities (probably small 
ones in rural France, out of a total of 36,000 in France) in the media (see http://www.bfmtv.com/
societe/securite-voisins-vigilants-surveillent-quartier-605578.html).
6 ‘Régalien’ is a difficult to translate word that is associated with the rise of the central authority and 
powers of the King of France over local or regional warlords. The concept includes the right to 
exercise the sole legitimate violence through the means of the army, the judiciary and the police.
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since the release of a White paper by the then French Minister of Interior Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, with a foreword by the President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy 
(INHESJ, 2008), a trend that was to be pursued later by socialist Minister of Interior 
Manuel Valls, see for example his speech of November 20137.
 3.2. The Theoretical and Practical Importance of the Distribution of Order Maintenance in 
the Public Space
After acknowledging apparent similarities (in the framing of the issue of privatiza-
tion) and dissimilarities (in relation with the actual role of central government and 
the involvement of citizens) between countries, we need to focus on why a new 
model of policing is emerging in France.
Why are public police authorities not stepping up in reaction to the rise of private 
and semi-private forms of policing? The explanation is twofold. First, and obviously, 
the fiscal crisis has restricted government investments in public security, and the 
subsequent lack of manpower has forced the private sector to buy its own security to 
compensate for the shortcomings of the official police. This explanation is certainly 
valid, but only partially.
The other explanation is that both private guards in private spaces and mediators 
in public spaces offer new styles of public space regulation that strongly differ from 
police practices—a different policing style. Most private guards are unarmed, and 
mediators are never armed. They patrol mainly on foot. Their activity relies on contact 
and dialogue with the public. Use of force during their activity is almost absent. 
Mediators, as suggested by their job title, seek to establish a relationship with the 
public, by mobilising relational skills. The ethnic identity of agents may be one of 
the aspects of their recruitment and action, even though this is denied officially 
(Bonnet, 2014): they often belong to the same minority ethnic groups as the public 
they should regulate. All these aspects depart significantly from the characteristics 
of the French public police. In a nutshell, private guards or mediators are not 
merely a cheaper version of police officers: they are qualitatively and symbolically 
different, and they enforce a different type of security, more attuned to the needs 
and priorities of customers (Bonnet, 2006; 2008; Wakefield, 2003).
The emergence of these new jobs affects police forces as a profession. Media-
tors take on activities of street patrolling, daily contact with the public, and order 
maintenance, all of which could be performed by the police. As a result, police 
officers, who also have to fulfil bureaucratic and procedural duties, often end up 
filling out paperwork relative to operations carried out by others. Therefore, French 
pluralization contributes to opening up police forces as an organization: although 
coordination with mediators might be weak, these new jobs do contribute to making 
the production of security more diverse and imply that the police have to negotiate 
and exchange information with other actors. Another aspect is that it reinforces a 
7 http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-Manuel-Valls-mai-2012-avril-2014/Interventions-
du-Ministre/Discours-aux-forces-de-securite, accessed 5 January 2015.
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tendency towards the bureaucratization of the police and tends to widen the gap 
with the citizenry.
How do these various actors coordinate their action on the field? Do they exchange 
information, define the limits of their respective roles in a more or less explicit 
manner? While conflicts do happen – police may criticise private guards for not 
disclosing information, mediators may criticize the police for not offering them 
support –, they seldom happen. While competition between these actors is limited, 
cooperation and shared strategies remain sporadic. While some networking proce-
dures do exist (how and when to call the police, for instance) and some information 
does get exchanged (Parisian nightwatchers send daily reports to their partners, 
including the police), relationships remain weakly integrated. Police officers may 
sometimes be wary of private guards, whom they regard as not entirely trustworthy, 
especially when they are from a minority and perceived as too close to the population 
they have to police.
The regulation of public behaviours in mass private property and enforcement 
of order maintenance in public spaces by non-public police personnel should 
attract theoretical attention, and has done so to a certain extent. Two overlapping 
questions can be raised here: What are the theoretical implications of such a shift 
on the legitimation of state power? And how to explain such a rise in continental 
E.U. countries such as France, that do not lack a strong state backbone, as opposed 
to post-communist Russia or post-apartheid South Africa, where the private security 
boom finds an easy explanation?
What can be observed in France is not only a pluralization of policing in the sense 
that private companies perform a ‘public duty’ (a duty that used to be the monopoly 
of government agents, i.e. civil servants), but also a ‘de-police-ation’ process: work 
that used to be done by the police is being taken over by agents which are neither 
central nor local police and sometimes not police at all, such as the French media-
tors. They are non-police actors, working outside of police organizations (municipal 
or national), possibly under the joint management of mayors and public utility 
companies (public transportation, housing).
The theoretical reading of the expansion of non-public policing is therefore 
twofold: central government is pulling back, and police forces are not the only means 
for ensuring tranquillity at the local level. In the context of southern continental 
Europe, this is not a benign remark. In fact, in these particular national contexts, 
the largest policing forces are not local, but national by status, i.e. they are affiliated 
to the central government and the agents are statutory national civil servants who 
operate under national laws. While security is almost universally conceived of as 
a kind of social right to be distributed under government auspices and by public 
agents, crucially, in France its distribution is centrally designed and orchestrated, as 
opposed to locally organised in other nations, such as the U.S. or the U.K., where 
public policing forces are mainly local (municipal in the U.S., regional in the U.K.).
This aspect should fundamentally inform any interpretation of such frequently 
referred-to phenomena as ‘pluralization’ or the ‘multiplication of agencies’. Obvi-
ously, ‘a complex of interlaced systems of agencies’ can be observed everywhere 
(Kemp et al., 1999, 199). But expressing such principles in highly general terms and 
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contexts makes them unclear and uncertain in their application. What matters as 
much as the status of the organizations (public or private) are the auspices under 
which they work (public or private, local or national).
Taking into account the governance, missions, and staffing of local security 
mechanisms might shed light on these issues. First of all, if pluralization is defined 
by an increase in either the number of organizations that are assigned to producing 
security in a given place, or by the types of agencies in charge of delivering such 
a service, then France is definitely embarked on a pluralization process. However, 
the pluralization that is occurring in France when it comes to public spaces has a 
dual meaning that we mentioned above: it is both a pluralization in terms of the 
balance between central and local leadership under public auspices on the one hand, 
and a hybridization of penal and non-penal approaches (and therefore police and 
non-police personnel) on the other.
The rise of local leadership at the level of municipalities has been one of the strik-
ing trends since the early 1980s. It is backed up by the decentralization of a whole 
series of former central government prerogatives, such as public transportation, 
social benefits allowance, roads, primary and secondary education – even if polic-
ing is not among them. Mayors have highlighted the political importance of daily 
security (the deputy mayor is often in charge of this dossier), have become players in 
local prevention of crime along with the police and the courts (Douillet & Maillard, 
2008), have strengthened their organizational capacities – revamping organizational 
charts; creating security directorates, prevention directorates, prevention and secu-
rity directorates; increasing municipal police headcount and hiring other personnel 
in charge of public peace; mobilizing technology, often including CCTV (Roché, 
2004) … In addition, and importantly, mayors have shifted the border between 
policing and non-policing tasks for the purpose of order maintenance (see above 
the observed renewal of ‘policing styles’, if we may say so for non-police agents). 
This does not seem to be a ‘French’ approach, in the sense of an idiosyncratic way 
of dealing with urban disorders. Instead, it may be interpreted as the plural way 
in which European cities have dealt with petty urban disorders, mobilizing a vast 
array of both repressive and non-repressive resources.
 4. Conclusion. Securing Public Places: Demonopolization with Limited 
Privatization
Rather than explaining the rise of private security in terms of personnel or turnover8, 
we have focused on how the security of public places or quasi-public spaces is gov-
erned in France. We have done so because of the centrality of spaces open to public 
8 This ‘can be categorized into six viable explanatory factors: (1) rising crime and related problems, 
(2) growth of mass private property, (3) economic rationalities, (4) government policy toward pri-
vate sector participation, (5) an overburdened police force and (6) professionalization of private 
security’, according to Van Steden, 2007, 35.
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in political debates. Do our observations and analysis feed the interpretation that 
France is undergoing such related processes as demonopolization and pluralization?
While we do conclude on the existence of overall demonopolization and pluraliza-
tion processes in France, we still believe a closer look is required. That pluralization 
is happening can be seen in the rapid growth of private companies that are assuming 
a new role by servicing new needs or taking over some police duties, although not in 
public places (streets, parks and the like) so far. These are times of fiscal restraint, 
which is likely to put more pressure on all form of governments in the short run, 
as has been the case in the recent past. However, demonopolization mainly impacts 
the central government, which ends up having to share with local authorities what 
was believed to be its prerogatives and responsibilities. Central demonopolization 
is accompanied by a reinforcement of local public authorities, in particular for 
managing the public spaces of large metropolitan areas. Therefore, the overall 
picture is more complex than a mere privatization shift from public to private, and 
includes a move from the central to the local level. In addition, local authorities tend 
to reinterpret local security in ‘non police-personnel only’ terms, making use of 
non-police personnel to undertake typical peacekeeping missions in public places. 
Pluralization happens at the organizational level (central and local governments) as 
well as in terms of means to an end (tranquillity). From this perspective, the French 
situation would be close to what Terpstra & al. (2013) call the ‘local government as 
the coordinator’: municipalities have reinforced their resources to regulate public 
spaces in a social and political context dominated by a growing concern for low-level 
physical and social disorders. To what extent an actor clearly playing a coordinator 
role will be established remains to be seen. In French localities, coexistence is often 
observed with a combination of central police personnel (a peculiarity of centralized 
policing systems), local police personnel, and local non-police personnel – the latter 
two reporting to the mayor. In the eyes of the national police, municipal officials 
do not enjoy sufficient legitimacy to act as ‘the’ coordinators.
On the whole, this gives a rather complicated image of the current pluralization 
of policing in France9. This conclusion tends to contend against the view, at least in 
France, of a neoliberal tide washing off the shores of the public design and provision 
of daily security, without acknowledging slow and major transformations in the 
provision of public security. The dynamics of Europeanization on the one hand and 
decentralization on the other are currently contributing to major reorganizations 
of the policing landscape in Europe. It is therefore no surprise that European 
conceptualizations come off as more complex than U.S. ones.
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